MISSING IN ACTION
Paul Vernon "Skip" Jackson III
SYNOPSIS:
The Steve Canyon program (Project 404) was a highly classified FAC (Forward Air Controller) operation covering the military regions of Laos. U.S. military operations in Laos were severely restricted during the Vietnam War era because Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva Accords. The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for military support in order to defend territory used by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos.
RAVEN was the tactical radio call sign which identified the pilots of the Steve Canyon Program. Ravens, all volunteers for the program, were rated Air Force pilots with at least six months FAC experience in Vietnam. Backgrounds varied and included graduates of a spectrum of universities ranging from the Air Force Academy to Berkeley. Many had prior enlisted service in sister services before coming into the Air Force. They tended to be superbly confident, experienced pilots, but by definition this implied that they were also mavericks and were considered to be more than a bit wild by the conventional military establishment. Spirits soared when they arrived in Laos, discovered that constraining rules were minimal and that they were free to fight. Unleashed, they fought. The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC and the 7/13th Air Force 56th. Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, but their pay, supply, and medical records were maintained by Detachment One at Udorn, Thailand. Officially, they were on loan to the U.S. Air Attach, in Vientiane. Unofficially, they flew from and were stationed at outposts like Long Tieng (Twenty Alternate) and provided tactical air support to CIA led field forces -- Lao, Thai, and Meo (Hmong) .
The U.S. Ambassador to Laos exercised field command of the Ravens and defined the Rules of Engagement for Raven control of all U.S. air strikes in Laos. Once checked out in their aircraft, they flew FAC missions. All tactical strike aircraft (fighter bombers) had to be controlled by a FAC, who was intimately familiar with the terrain, the population, locations of friendly forces, and the changing tactical situation. The FAC would locate the target, request U.S., Lao, or H'mung fighter/bombers with an appropriate ordnance load from an orbiting airborne command and control center, accurately mark the target by using white phosphorus (Willy Pete) rockets, an d control weapons delivery throughout the air strike. After the fighters were finished the FAC remained over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA). Strike aircraft included sorties flown by the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Many were flown from carriers. The FAC also had to assure that there were no civilians targeted, a complex problem in a war without no front lines where any hamlet could suddenly become part of the combat zone. A Raven FAC needed a fighter pilot's experience and mentality, but was obliged to fly slow and low in unarmed and vulnerable aircraft such as the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog or a U-17, a standard Cessna 185 with rocket tubes mounted beneath the wings and a huge iron sight jutting up from the engine cowl. Aircraft flown by the Ravens were continually peppered by ground fire. A piece of strong metallic fabric tape was simply slapped over bullet holes and strike missions flown until the aircraft became no longer fit to fly. Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the war. The need for secrecy kept their numbers low (never more than 22 at one time), and continuous enemy pressure on ground forces frequently required that each pilot fly 10 or 12 hour days. Some Ravens completed their in country tour, approximately 6 months, with a total of over 500 combat missions. The Ravens at Long Tieng in Military Region II, had, for several years, the most difficult area in Laos.
The base, nested in karst on the southern edge of the Plain of Jars, was the headquarters for the CIA-funded Meo army commanded by General Vang Pao. An interesting account of this group can be read in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens". Skip Jackson was Raven Two One and stationed at Long Tieng.
On December 24, 1972, Christmas Eve, Skip Jackson found substantial stacks of NVA supplies under trees on the PDJ and requested tactical air to destroy those supplies. Four Air Force A-7 aircraft (SLAM Flight) responded. Capt. Chuck Riess was a member of that flight flying SLAM Zero Four. The site under attack possessed both 12.7 and 14.5 weapons and the enemy had no reluctance to use them. After briefing the fighters and marking the target th e Raven sequentially cleared each of the fighters 'in hot', to release bombs on the supplies below. A-7's were a particular delight to FACs because they could put bombs on target with extraordinarily destructive accuracy. During SLAM Zero Four's pass the FAC abruptly pulled into an almost vertical climb and right into the A-7's flight path. Don't know why. The A-7 maneuvered violently to avoid collision with the FAC. The O-1's left wing strut was clipped, the left wing parted. The A-7 became uncontrol lable. Riess punched out. Another FAC, "Raven 20", piloted by Chuck Hines, arrived on-scene from Twenty Alternate a few minutes later. Both aircraft were visible on the ground, the A-7 still burning and Riess already in enemy hands. Riess had landed almost at the front door of an underground NVA Regimental Artillery command post. After what must have been a spectacular descent with only one wing attached to the airplane, the O-1 came to rest on the ground sitting upright on its main and tail gear. Hines reported that Skip Jackson was dead, based on what he had personally observed from a very low altitude visual check of the crash scene.
Returning the evening of 24 DEC 72, he debriefed, reported the facts and strongly recommended an immediate KIA status report for Jackson. The MIA to KIA status change evident in the record reflects administrative processing errors at the clerical level -- and in no way reflects any lingering doubt that Skip was deceased upon impact with the ground. Charles F. Riess was captured immediately upon landing after ejecting from his A-7. The U.S. carried him as missing, even though it was known he was marched barefoot to Hanoi, and was held in Hanoi with other American POWs.
The Vietnamese kept Riess and several others captured by the Vietnamese in Laos completely separated from other American POWs until shortly before repatriation. In the spring of 1973, when 591 Americans were freed, Riess' release came as a complete and very welcome surprise. Riess had not been held in Laos.
Skip Jackson is one of nearly 600 Americans lost in Laos. Even though the Pathet Lao stated publicly that they held "tens of tens" of American prisoners, not one American held in Laos was ever released -- or negotiated for. His crash site has yet to be excavated, his remains yet to be found and returned home.
| Compiled by Homecoming II Project April 1, 1990 with the assistance of one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK 1998 with information provided by "Raven 20," Chuck Hines. |